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Abstract: This paper aims to conceptualize the 
upsurge of governmental interest in evidence-
based policy in Britain by drawing on two models 
of policy-evidence interface; the instrument al 
and the enlightenment model. It argues that 
much of the drive behind the enthusiasm for 
evidence is rooted in the linear and utilitarian 
view of research which is broadly based on three 
interrelated misconceptions about the nature 
of evidence, the role of experts, and the infl u-
ence that these can have on policy. By drawing 
on examples from the UK planning systems, the 
paper explores the mismatch between the use 
of evidence in the “ideal” and the “real” worlds 
of planning and policy process. It is argued that 
the assumption made under the positivist view 
of planning in the 1960s and 1970s are similar 
to those made under the instrumental view of 
the policy-research interface.
The Rise of Evidence-Based Policy 
in Britain
There was a time when evidence was seen as an 
essential part of criminal conviction. Today, it 
seems that it has become an important part of 
political conviction, too (Solesbury 2002); or so 
we are led to believe. This is because, in Britain, 
there has been a growing governmental empha-
sis on more evidence-based policy and practice, 
particularly since the publication of the White 
Paper on Modernising Government, which states: 
“This Government expects more of policy-
 makers. More new ideas, more willingness to 
question inherited ways of doing things, better 
use of evidence and research in policy-making.” 
(Cabinet Offi ce 1999a: para. 6)
While the debate over the nature of evidence 
and its role in policy-making has a long and 
contested history (see Faludi and Waterhout in 
this issue), the term evidence-based policy is 
relatively new and a seemingly British inven-
tion. In an essay that advocates the adoption of 
an evidence-based approach to American pub-
lic policy, the Urban Institute argues that, un-
like the United States where “public policy has 
been conceived, debated and evaluated through 
the lenses of ideologies”, in the UK,  evidence-
based policy is gaining momentum (UI 2003: 1). 
Such an argument is not surprising, given the 
rise in research budgets, recruitment of analyti-
cal staff and the proliferation of research and 
consultancy work at all levels of government in 
the late 1990s. For example, in 1998/99 alone, 
over 350 million pounds were spent by govern-
ment departments on policy-related research 
(Cabinet Offi ce 1999b). 
However, this apparently “peculiar British 
affair” (Solesbury 2002: 93) has been taking 
place in “most other Anglophone countries, and 
most especially in post-colonial societies such 
as Australia and New Zealand” (David 2002: 
213) as well as Canada. The latter, for example, 
launched a Policy Research initiative in 1996 
to build a “solid foundation” upon which future 
policy decisions could be made. Similarly, in 
New Zealand, work has been carried out by the 
State Services Commission to consider the ef-
fective use of information in policy advice (re-
ported in Cabinet Offi ce 1999b). In Europe too, 
the concept has been taken up by the European 
Commission, as manifested in its White Paper 
on Governance, which emphasizes that “scien-
tifi c and other experts play an increasingly sig-
nifi cant role in preparing and monitoring deci-
sions.” (CEC 2001: 428) One example is a major 
program of research called the European Spatial 
Planning Observation Network (ESPON), which 
has been funded to develop the evidence base of 
the European territorial policy (see Böhme and 
Schön in this issue). 
As to the reason for its upsurge in Britain, 
Solesbury (2002) argues that some consider this 
a sign of New Labour’s emphasis on a pragmatic 
rather than an ideological stance, and the shift 
in the nature of politics, while others see it as 
a manifestation of knowledge-power relation-
ships with the incoming New Labour creating 
a renewed demand for knowledge to empower 
politicians to challange the established infl u-
ences, particularly within the civil service.  This 
fi rst view is based on Francis Bacon’s famous 
dictum that “knowledge is power” (Bacon 2000). 
However, as will be discussed below, the oppo-
site is also true, that “power is knowledge” and 
that “power determines what counts as know-
ledge, what kind of interpretation attains au-
thority as the dominant interpretation.” (Flyvj-
berg 1998: 226)
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While discussion about basing policy on evi-
dence is not new, the ability to achieve this goal 
and to actually take account of evidence in pol-
icy is shrouded with rhetorical assumptions. In 
broad terms, there are two distinct views about 
the policy-research interface: the instrumental 
view and the enlightenment view. 
Instrumental Model
The instrumental view assumes that the rela-
tionship between evidence and policy is un-
problematic, linear and direct. It is assumed 
that either research leads policy and hence pol-
icy is evidence-driven; or research follows policy 
and hence research is policy-driven. As Young et 
al. (2002: 216) suggest, the former contains “an 
element of scientifi c inevitability..., of the expert 
‘on top’”, while in the latter, research is shaped 
by policy concerns, and “the expert is ‘on tap’, 
but not on top.”  Both represent a simple, linear 
view of the policy-research interface (see Fig-
ure 1), which “differ only in the posited direction 
of infl uence.” (ibid.) 
Much of the drive in the late 1990s for an 
evidence-based approach to policy and practice 
in the UK has been based on this linear utilitar-
ian view. This is particularly true in terms of the 
expert-on-tap model, where the emphasis is on 
speed, i.e., on the need for evidence to be timely, 
intelligible and available on demand. Indeed, 
the new buzzword in the government depart-
ments is: “What matters is what works,” with-
out much attention being paid to what works 
for whom and in what circumstances (Leices-
ter 2002). This was clearly refl ected in a speech 
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to the Economic and Social Research Council 
(ESRC) in February 2000 by the then Education 
Secretary, David Blunkett, in which he stated 
that “social science research evidence is cen-
tral to development and evaluation of policy… 
We need to be able to rely on social science and 
social scientists to tell us what works and why 
and what types of policy initiatives are likely to 
be most effective.” (quoted in Young et al. 2002: 
215)
Since the publication of the White Paper on 
Modernising Government, there has been a grow-
ing pressure on research funding organizations 
to adopt a utilitarian approach, and support 
research which is not just useful but useable 
(Solesbury 2002). It was this kind of pressure 
that led to the ESRC’s decision to fund an ini-
tiative on Evidence-Based Policy and Practice 
in 1999 with a budget of three million pounds1. 
The new Centre for Evidence-Based Policy 
which emerged from this initiative acts as the 
hub for seven network nodes, each focusing on 
a different area, including one on the planning-
related area of urban neighborhoods. Their 
aim is to acquire access to major databases and 
original documents on social science research 
(Packwood 2002: 268). 
One of the problems with research for poli-
cy’s sake (Weiss 1977), is that it is highly selec-
tive, if not opportunistic; with those areas that 
have not been considered as policy problems 
failing to attract investment in research. As Da-
voudi (in press) has shown, strategic planning 
for waste management is a striking example of 
such a policy area, to the extent that a recent 
House of Commons’ Report2 concluded that 
“the lack of high-quality data is a signifi cant ob-
stacle to the formulation and implementation of 
public policy.” (HCEFRA 2005: 8) Referring to 
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that “no-one seems to have a clue what is go-
ing where, compositionally, geographically or 
by industry sector.” (op. cit.: 7) Hence, although 
the emphasis on evidence is generally seen as a 
positive move, there is a growing body of litera-
ture which points to the problems of focusing 
on a narrow instrumentalism (Davoudi, in press; 
Owens et al. 2004; Young et al. 2002; Packwood 
2002; Solesbury 2002).
Enlightenment Model
There is, however, another view of how research 
affects policy called the enlightenment model. 
Here, rather than research serving the policy 
agenda directly, its benefi ts are indirect and 
sometimes take longer to be realized. The em-
phasis is not to produce “punchy policy mes-
sages”3, but to illuminate the landscape within 
which policy decisions have to be made. The 
emphasis is on providing a deeper understand-
ing of the conditions within which different 
interventions might be effective (Young et al. 
2002: 217). Under the enlightenment model, the 
emphasis is on evidence-informed policy rather 
than evidence-based policy. This means that al-
though research does and should play an im-
portant role in policy-making, that role is less 
one of problem solving than of clarifying the 
context and informing the wider public debate. 
As Shulock (1999: 241) puts it, research “serves 
best not as a comprehensive, problem-solving, 
scientifi c enterprise, but as a contributor to an 
informed discourse.” 
However, the current interest in evidence-
based policy is dominated by a utilitarian view 
of research which is underpinned by a number 
of fl awed assumptions about the way in which 
policy handles input from evidence (with evi-
dence being understood largely as scientifi c re-
search). These assumptions are based on three 
interrelated misconceptions about the nature 
of evidence, the role of experts, and the infl u-
ence these can have on policy. At the risk of 
some oversimplifi cation, these misconceptions 
are often expressed as: policy-making is a ra-
tional process, evidence can only be generated 
through positive science, and experts are apol-
itical and value-free – and they know best. 
As discussed below, the current instrumen-
tal view of policy-evidence interplay has a lot 
in common with the positivist view of planning, 
especially during its heydays in the 1960s and 
1970s. Both portray a limited understanding of 
the mismatch between the role of evidence in an 
ideal world and the way it is actually used in the 
real world. The following account will elaborate 
on these in turn.
The Use of Evidence in an Ideal World
of Planning and Policy Process
In Britain, as in many other countries, the use of 
evidence in the planning process has a long and 
contested history. For example, using descrip-
tive data and trend statistics is one of the old-
est and most enduring practices in planning. In 
fact, a key trigger of the late 19th century public 
health and housing acts, which were the prede-
cessors to the post-war planning system, was a 
social survey undertaken by Charles Booth in 
1887 to quantify the social problems of Lon-
don. This is considered the fi rst modern survey. 
Yet, within the planning community, the term 
survey has become strongly affi liated with the 
Geddesian survey-analysis-plan. Patrick Ged-
des’ famous aphorism:  “survey before plan”, 
coined in the early 20th century, remained every 
planning student’s grand rule of good practice 
for many decades. Geddes, infl uenced by the 
French geographers and sociologists, insisted 
that “planning must start with a survey of the 
resources …; in all his teaching, his most persis-
tent emphasis was on the survey method.” (Hall 
2002: 147) In his Outlook Tower in Edinburgh, 
he even created a local survey center.  
However, these survey works were essen-
tially related to physical aspects of the cities 
and regions. The plans which were based on 
these surveys were master plans; blueprints for 
an end-state which would one day be achieved. 
This was the time when planning was seen as 
a physical, design-based activity. According to 
Taylor (1998: 66f.) the Geddesian dictum of 
“survey-analysis-plan” (SAP) had at least three 
shortcomings. Firstly, it was not clear why a 
survey needed to be done; in other words, 
the Geddesian approach remained unclear 
about the need for a pre-survey stage of prob-
lem defi nition. Apart from general statements 
such as Abercrombie’s triangle of objectives: 
“beauty, health and convenience” (Abercrom-
bie 1933: 139), the goal was left implicit, to 
be defi ned intuitively by planners themselves 
who were seen as “experts”, apolitical and the 
“guardian of public interests.” (Hall 2002: 324) 
Secondly, the SAP approach implied that 
the outcome would be one single plan rather 
than a number of alternative strategies. Thirdly, 
the approach implied that the planning pro-
cess would end with the production of the plan. 
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such as those written by Abercrombie (1933) 
and Keeble (1959), no assumptions were made 
about the need for a learning process, or indeed 
any discussion on implementation and updat-
ing. It was, as Batty (1979) calls it, the “golden 
age” of planning when “the assumed certainty of 
the process was such that possible links back to 
the reality in the form of new surveys were rarely 
if ever considered… This certainty, based on the 
infallibility of the expert, reinforced the apol-
itical, technical nature of the process.” (Batty 
1979: 31)  
While the Geddesian approach can be seen 
as a typical linear view of evidence-policy inter-
face with strong elements of instrumentalism, it 
was profoundly different from its successor, ra-
tional planning, in two important ways: fi rstly, in 
terms of the type and quality of evidence, which 
was limited to physical description; and sec-
ondly, in terms of the role of the planner which 
was seen as being imaginative and visionary, 
not only in setting the goals, but also in taking 
a creative leap from the analysis of the survey 
to the making of the plan. Hence, despite the 
rhetoric of the survey-analysis-plan, “plan and 
planning decisions were made largely on the 
basis of intuition or rather, on the basis of sim-
plistic aesthetic conceptions of urban form and 
layout which embodied physical determinist as-
sumptions about how best to accommodate the 
diverse economic and social life.” (Taylor 1998: 
15)  As Eric Reade (1987) argues, planning prac-
tice was not grounded in empirical research and 
theory. 
Indeed, the planning movement of the late 
19th and early 20th centuries was highly ideo-
logical, embedded in the reformist ideas of a 
number of visionary individuals who, despite 
being considered the founding fathers of the 
planning movement4, were not trained as plan-
ners. Concepts such as “expert” and “profes-
sional” planners did not enter the vocabulary 
of planning practice until the 1930s when the 
Town Planning Institute provided a town plan-
ning qualifi cation, which was followed by the 
establishment of the fi rst recognized planning 
schools in Britain (Davoudi, Whitney 2005). 
It was not until the 1960s when the wider 
social-economic information and analytic evi-
dence opened their way into the making of 
plans and planning decisions. The hallmark of 
what, in Thomas Kuhn’s words, was “a para-
digm shift” (Kuhn 1962) in planning thoughts 
were two distinct theories: the systems view of 
cities, and the view of planning as a rational 
process of decision-making. While the former 
deals with “substantive” planning theory (the 
object of planning), the latter deals with “pro-
cedural” planning theory (the process of plan-
ning) (Faludi 1973). In the terminology of this 
paper, the former relates to what is or should 
be the evidence base of planning, while the lat-
ter is about what is considered as the nature of 
planning process and the role of planners in 
that process.
The systems view of planning which was de-
rived from the science of cybernetics, developed 
by Norbert Wiener in 1948 and was imported 
into planning by the works of Brian McLough-
lin and George Chadwick in the 1960s, concep-
tualized cities and regions as complex systems, 
or indeed as a spatially-based sub-systems of 
larger systems. Seen in those terms, the concept 
of planning was considered as: fi rstly, under-
standing such complex systems, and secondly, 
engaging in a continuous process of control and 
monitoring of these systems. Given that exercis-
ing intelligent control over a system requires a 
prior understanding of the system to be con-
trolled, planning was conceived as a form of sys-
tems analysis and control (Taylor 1998: 62).  
This in turn required the type of evidence 
which was more analytical than descriptive 
and more sophisticated than the simple survey 
work advocated by Geddes. Planners needed 
to analyze and understand how cities and re-
gions functioned spatially in economic and so-
cial terms. That knowledge was to come from 
an intellectual revolution which took place in 
the mid-1950s in urban and regional studies 
and human geography which led to the ideas 
that were later imported into planning in the 
1960s and had their widest infl uence on plan-
ning thought in the fi rst half of the 1970s. Plan-
ners, largely via geographers, began to discover 
the works of German location theorists, notably 
Walter Christaller, and his central place theory 
which was developed much earlier, in the 1930s. 
They explored the tenets of Logical Positivism 
and suggested that the evidence base of plan-
ning should move away from simple descriptive 
physical surveys represented in detailed maps 
and blueprints towards developing general hy-
potheses about spatial distributions which could 
be tested against the reality; the very essence of 
scientifi c method advocated by Popper in his 
best-known essay: “Science: Conjectures and 
Refutations” where he suggested that “the crite-
rion for the scientifi c status of a theory is its falsi-
fi ability, or refutability or testability.” (in: Popper 
1969: 37, italic original) 
Viewing cities as interconnected systems 
with economic and social dimensions rather 
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required a broadening of the knowledge base of 
planning within the education system, too. This 
was achieved by the review of planning educa-
tion by the Schuster Committee in 1948 which 
recommended: fi rstly, to widen the entrants to 
the profession to include geographers, econo-
mists and sociologists, and secondly, to incorpor-
ate greater social science input into planning 
courses (Schuster 1950).  
Using mathematical techniques and the 
data-processing powers of computers, a new, 
heavily engineer-based (Hall 2002) spatial 
science emerged which aimed to develop spatial 
interaction models capable of measuring and 
predicting patterns of spatial change, particu-
larly in the area of transportation planning. The 
quantitative revolution in the 1960s stemmed 
from a desire to provide geography and plan-
ning studies with a fi rmer theoretical and 
scientifi c foundation and hence to improve their 
standing within the family of social sciences. 
Systems theory with its claim to scientifi c rigour, 
coupled with quantifi cation methods, offered 
the hope for a way forward in changing plan-
ning from what was traditionally seen as an art 
to a science. 
This refl ected developments in other policy 
areas where there was a “renewed faith in the 
application of ‘science’ to policy- making – not 
only in applying the fi ndings of scientifi c re-
search but also in relation to the policy-making 
itself.” (Taylor 1998: 69) This cybernetic model 
of planning, which was based on both systems 
theory and rational process, was closely asso-
ciated with and refl ected the rise of modern-
ism after the Second World War (Giddens 1994: 
58). 
Policy process was considered a rational 
process of decision-making in which techni-
cal professionals played a key role in advising 
the politicians on the best course of action. The 
rational process of planning involved a cycle of 
fi ve logical steps, including: defi nition of prob-
lems and/or goals, identifi cation of alternative 
policies/plans; evaluation of these alternatives; 
implementation of the preferred plans/policies; 
and monitoring and review of these policies. 
However, this ideal rational process of how de-
cisions ought to be made hardly matched the 
“disjointed, incremental” process that char-
acterized how decisions were actually made 
in practice (Lindblom 1959). As Taylor (1998) 
points out, the cybernetic model of planning 
control marked the high tide of post-war mod-
ernist optimism with its legacy going back to the 
18th century European Enlightenment. 
The assumptions made in rational planning 
(and particularly rational comprehensive plan-
ning) of the 1960s and 1970s bear a strong re-
semblance to the assumptions made today in 
the instrumental view of evidence-based pol-
icy. Both conceive policy-making and planning 
as sciences in which scientifi c, value-free tech-
niques are employed to solve well-defi ned and 
neatly-structured problems. Both have their 
roots in a misconception about the nature of real 
world decision-making which Nancy Shulock 
(1999) calls “the paradox of policy analysis.” This 
paradox arises from “the mismatch between no-
tions of how the policy process should work and 
its actual messy, uncertain, unstable and essen-
tially political realities.” (Young et al. 2002: 218) 
By drawing on examples from planning, the fol-
lowing section aims to outline some of the chal-
lenges of injecting a perceived evidence-based 
certainty and predictability into the messy am-
biguities of real world policy-making. 
The Use of Evidence in the Real World
of Planning and Policy Processes
The messy world of policy-making and planning 
is littered with practical and institutional short-
comings which are far from the perfect rational 
model that the rhetoric of evidence-based plan-
ning leads us to believe. It is also infused with 
political and social ideologies and laden with 
value judgments. Ball, drawing a sharp contrast 
to ideal policy-making and planning, portrays 
an intriguing picture of what the real world of 
policy process looks like. He suggests that pol-
icy-making is a matter of bricolage rather than 
consistent principles:
It’s a matter of borrowing and copying bits and 
pieces of ideas from elsewhere, drawing upon and 
amending locally tried and tested approaches, 
cannibalising theories, research, trends and fash-
ions and not infrequently fl ailing around for any-
thing at all that looks as if it might work. Most 
policies are ramshackle, compromise hit- and-
miss affairs, that are reworked, tinkered with, nu-
anced and infl ected through a complex process of 
infl uence, text production, dissemination and, ul-
timately, re-creation in contexts of practice. (Ball 
1998: 126, quoted in Nixon et al. 2002: 238)
One of the frequent assumptions, for example, 
is that it is easier for policy-makers to make 
policies if they have access to all relevant in-
formation. In practice, however, more or better 
information may indeed lead to further confu-
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choices which could otherwise be made more 
easily “under conditions of relative ignorance.” 
(Young et al. 2002: 218) John Maynard Keynes 
once suggested that “there is nothing a govern-
ment hates more than to be well-informed; for 
it makes the process of arriving at decisions 
much more complicated and diffi cult.” (Ski-
delsky 1992: 630) 
This echoes a pleasantly paradoxical remark 
from Bernard William’s Ethics and the Limit of 
Philosophy (1985: 148) which says: “refl ection 
can destroy knowledge”, meaning that “people’s 
sense of social and moral direction can depend 
on not asking too many questions.” (Hollis 1994: 
245) Moreover, the context within which the in-
terface between research and policy is played 
out is an important factor in the extent to which 
evidence is taken into account in decision-mak-
ing (Nutley et al. 2003). Practical, institutional 
and political factors can lead to what Carol 
Weiss (1997) calls the “problem of little effect.” 
The problem-solving model of evidence-based 
policy overlooks the fact that a great deal of 
applied research, including research commis-
sioned and paid for by the government, tends 
to sit on the shelf and gather dust; rarely being 
followed by policy-makers. For example, a re-
cent audit of the UK government departments 
which was undertaken by the Cabinet Offi ce as a 
follow-up to the publication of the White Paper 
on Modernising Government, shows the patchy 
role that evidence plays in day-to-day policy-
making. The report stated that their “interviews 
revealed anecdotal evidence that little of the re-
search commissioned by departments or other 
academic research was used by policy-makers.” 
(Cabinet Offi ce, 1999b: 36) 
The ideal policy process fails to recognize 
that evidence is not the only contender for in-
fl uencing policy. Weiss (2001: 286) identifi es at 
least four other powerful competitors and calls 
them the four Is: “ideology, interests, institu-
tional norms and practices, and prior informa-
tion.” Ideology refers to basic values and un-
derlying belief systems which often shape, and 
sometimes determine, policy outcome in such a 
way that no amount of valid data and evidence 
can change it, at least not in the short term. As 
mentioned above, the post-war planning system 
in Britain is a clear case of the signifi cant role 
played by ideologies and values in the framing 
of policies. The principle of urban containment, 
for example, was introduced and sustained to 
date largely on the basis of strong values that 
people (or some would say a powerful group of 
middle-class, suburban property owners) have 
continued to attach to the protection of country-
side, rather than scientifi c evidence. 
Indeed, even the monumental study under-
taken by Sir Peter Hall and his team (Hall 1973) 
which established the perverse and non-egali-
tarian effects of a strong policy on urban con-
tainment (largely through a strict Green Belt 
policy) was not able to make a direct impact on 
future policy. As regards the distributive effect 
of post-war planning, Hall argued (1974: 407) 
that “the effect of planning has been to give 
more to those that already had most, while tak-
ing away from the poor what little they had.” 
Thirty years later, the social and distribu-
tional effects of the planning system has come 
under scrutiny again. This time by a Treasury-
funded study undertaken by Kate Barker and 
through a focus on the shortage of housing sup-
ply in England and the consequential (accord-
ing to the report) rise in house prices in the 
last decade which has made home ownership 
an unaffordable prospect for a large section of 
society (Barker et al. 2004). Whether, and how, 
the Barker Review makes any real difference in 
a long-standing policy on urban containment 
remains to be seen. 
Weiss’s second contender to policy-making 
is interest, which refers to people’s and organi-
zations’ self-interests and expediencies which 
may undermine the use of evidence. A reveal-
ing example is one stated by the Department 
of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DE-
FRA) under the self-imposed question: “What 
do we mean by evidence?” They answer: “Any 
information that helps turn DEFRA’s strategic 
priorities into something concrete, manageable 
and achievable.” (DEFRA 2005) In other words, 
evidence is needed to justify and/or implement 
priorities that have already been decided upon. 
Young et al. (2002) refer to this as the po-
litical/tactical model of evidence-based policy. 
Under this model, policy is seen as the sole 
outcome of political process, with the research 
agenda being politically driven to establish a 
particular point and justify a particular policy 
direction, often through a process of cherry-
picking, where some evidence is used or am-
plifi ed while other evidence is disregarded or 
marginalized. The support for the growth of 
“think tanks” during the Thatcher administra-
tion, for example, is seen by some commenta-
tors as a deliberate strategy for providing “intel-
lectual legitimacy” to policies that were already 
decided and that also “helped to sustain the 
radical momentum of Thatcherism by reinforc-
ing the sense of a collective crusade.” (Denham 
and Garnett 1996: 52) 
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er’s forthcoming second report which will focus 
specifi cally on the economic impact of plan-
ning. The fact that the report was commissioned 
jointly by the Treasury and the ODPM shortly 
after a major reform of the planning system is 
considered by some to be a politically-driven, 
“narrow and biased inquiry” (Ellis 2006: 10), 
infl uenced by an argument evoked by big busi-
ness. This suggests that planning is a brake on 
wealth creation; an unnecessary regulatory ac-
tivity which stifl es enterprise. This argument, 
which goes back to the late 1970s when Mi-
chael Heseltine famously said that “every night 
thousands of jobs are locked away in the fi ling 
trays of planning departments” (quoted in Ward 
1994), has since become the hallmark of pro-
market, anti-planning debate. 
The third contender is the infl uence of insti-
tutional traditions, culture and capacity in terms 
of the salience of research in decision-making 
processes, the ways in which research is com-
municated, and the ability of the organization 
to make sense of the available research. It is 
about how knowledge is created, accumulated, 
transferred and used. For example, the Cabi-
net Offi ce Report, mentioned earlier, points out 
that the demand for quick fi xes discourages the 
commissioning or the use of in-depth research, 
and, where time is not a constraint, it is the sheer 
volume of research material which is daunting 
for policy-makers (Cabinet Offi ce 1999b: 36). 
Hence, it seems that decision-makers demand 
more analyses than they can easily digest. 
Yet, the issue is not just one of information 
overload, but also a shortage of intelligent users 
of research who have the skill to understand or 
interpret available information (ibid.). The Re-
port recommends enhancing the skills of pol-
icy-makers in dealing with evidence  to know 
where to fi nd it, how to commission it, and how 
to use it (ibid.). Among the core competencies 
identifi ed by the report for what they call pro-
fessional policy-making, is the ability to “use 
evidence”. Hence, the Report concludes that 
“ensuring that policy-making becomes more 
soundly based on evidence of what works means 
tackling two key issues – the need to improve 
departments’ capacity to make best use of evi-
dence; and the need to improve the accessibil-
ity of the evidence available to policy-makers.” 
(op. cit.: 37)
Making evidence accessible requires better 
communication channels between policy and 
research communities. A frequently rehearsed 
barrier to knowledge transfer relates to the poli-
ticians’ inability or lack of time in reading long 
written reports. Such reluctance seems to go 
back as far as eleventh century England, as re-
corded by the medieval historian, Clanchy:
Both to ignorant illiterate and to sophisticated 
Platonists, written record was [a] dubious gift, be-
cause it seemed to kill living eloquence and trust 
and substitute for them a mummifi ed semblance in 
the form of a piece of parchment.
(quoted in Blackler 1995: 1032) 
Old habits die hard; today it is common knowl-
edge that the vast majority of the huge volume 
of reports remains largely unread by policy-
makers and practitioners. However, it would be 
wrong to think that this is a peculiar, die-hard 
English habit, because as Weiss (2001: 286) re-
ports, “the U.S. Congress [also] works largely 
through face-to-face dealings … Members do 
little reading… Research that arrives in written 
documents doesn’t have much of a chance.” 
Weiss’ fourth contender in policy-making is 
prior information, which can be expanded to 
include the wider issue of the nature of evi-
dence itself. The Oxford English Dictionary de-
fi nes evidence as: “The available body of facts 
or information indicating whether a belief or 
proposition is true or valid.” (OED 1998) This 
shows that:
• Firstly, facts or information are not in them-
selves evidence, they become evidence when 
they are used in conjunction with other facts to 
prove or disprove a proposition. 
• Secondly, evidence is not limited to research 
fi ndings and includes multiple sources of differ-
ent forms of formal and informal, expert and ex-
periential, and systematic and tacit knowledge. 
As David (2002: 213) suggests, the notions of 
evidence and research have been contextualized 
so that they “are not deemed to be the same.”
• Thirdly, what counts as evidence is what is 
available and also what is accessible, at any 
given time and place. 
• Finally, there is a question of validity, not only 
in terms of the validity of facts and information, 
but also in terms of the validity and relevance 
of the relationships between facts and the pro-
posed proposition. 
Moreover, in many cases, evidence can either 
be incomplete, contradictory or inconclusive, 
adding to the diffi culty of taking informed de-
cisions rather than reducing it (Cabinet Offi ce 
1999b). For example, despite numerous stud-
ies and reports on the economic, social and 
environmental cost and benefi t of high-density 
residential development, the evidence is still in-
conclusive and open to different interpretations 
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cally, while the debate is still ongoing, policy has 
already been made and high-density develop-
ment is now seen as a way of achieving sustain-
able communities. Some even argue that the 
evidence-based approach to policy is ideologi-
cal in the sense that it supports particular be-
liefs and values compatible with the dominant 
cultural paradigms that defi ne how people and 
society function. According to Packwood (2002: 
267), these are determined by defi nitions of ef-
fectiveness as a quantitative measure, profes-
sionalism as performativity, and “credible” evi-
dence as statistical meta-analysis. 
When it comes to infl uencing policy, it 
should be noted that new evidence does not en-
ter a pristine environment, it has to fi t into the 
policy-makers’ general understanding of how 
the world works. Such understanding comes 
from a variety of sources ranging from scientifi c, 
systematic research evidence to anecdotal ex-
periences and tacit and un-codifi ed know ledge. 
Policy process is as much about power rela-
tions and competition over agenda setting as it 
is about fi nding the truth and solving the prob-
lems. Overlooking this, researchers often com-
plain about political barriers to the use of scien-
tifi c and technical know-how. However, scientifi c 
and technical know-how will be more effective 
if the social and political were acknowledged 
as frameworks from the outset (Davoudi 2006). 
As Flyvbjerg (2001: 142) suggests “knowledge 
about the phenomena which decide whether … 
knowledge gets to count is as important at least 
as that knowledge itself. If you are not knowl-
edgeable about the former, you cannot be effec-
tive with the latter.”
Finally, there is the issue of the evidential na-
ture of social science itself (Young et al. 2002), 
a subject which has evoked fi erce debates ever 
since social sciences began to establish their 
standing as “scientifi c”. However, such uncer-
tainties are not exclusive to social science. As 
Popper suggests, “The empirical basis of objec-
tive science has … nothing ‘absolute’ about it. 
Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The 
bold structure of its theories rises, as it were, 
above swamp.” (Popper 1959: 111) 
To sum up, contrary to the instrumental view 
of evidence-based policy and planning, the real-
world experience clearly shows that “there is 
more to policy and practice than the disinter-
ested pursuit of truth and wisdom.” (Solesbury 
2002: 93) It takes more than knowledge and 
ideas to make policy. Creativity and imagination 
play a signifi cant part in transforming ideas into 
workable policy proposals. It also takes mobi-
lization and political support to turn the pro-
posals into policy (Weiss 2001: 289). The plan-
ning system in Britain in the 1980s and 1990s 
became the antithesis of the above statement. 
Planning was heavily criticized for its lack of 
imagination and creativity, and for becoming 
a bureaucratic regulatory routine, largely pre-
occupied with procedural rather than substan-
tive issues. Project-by-project confl ict media-
tion and negotiation and detailed knowledge 
of regulatory rules became planners’ new stock 
in trade. 
In the world of practice, evidence remained 
synonymous with “proper surveys”. A study com-
missioned by the RTPI concluded that plans were 
“fi t for purpose” if they were “based on proper 
and adequate survey…” (Crow et al. 2000: 21). 
The report stated that one of the “classical vir-
tues” of a good plan was “the soundness of rea-
soning and of the factual base, and also being up 
to date.” (ibid.) This, as before, was interpreted 
in terms of routine data collection and statistical 
monitoring of the trends, with little connection 
to the wider debate about the conceptualization 
of space and place. 
The Move towards a Sound Plan
In 2004, the notion of soundness entered the 
new planning legislation5 which introduced the 
move away from land use to spatial planning 
in the UK. While what is considered to be a 
“sound” plan relates mainly to the plan’s con-
formity with appropriate procedures and poli-
cies of the higher tier plans and policies, it is 
also related to whether or not the plan is based 
on evidence. Hence, a whole section of the na-
tional Planning Policy Statement 12 (PPS 12) 
is devoted to the “development of the evidence 
base” which states: “Local planning authorities 
should prepare and maintain an up-to-date in-
formation base on key aspects of … their area, 
to enable the preparation of a sound spatial 
plan.” (ODPM 2004: 32, para 4.8) Elsewhere in 
the PPS12, it states that “at the earliest stage in 
the preparation of the development plan docu-
ment, ... the local planning authority should 
gather evidence about their area.” (ibid., para 
4.11)
An independent panel will then examine the 
plan and “test its soundness” on the basis of a 
long list of criteria which also include whether 
“the strategies… are founded on a robust and 
credible evidence base” and whether “there 
are clear mechanisms for implementation and 
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“the scope and scale of evidence”, PPS12 makes 
it clear that “examinations are not the place to 
press the detailed merits of proposed develop-
ment schemes. Inspectors are interested in the 
evidence and reasoning behind the authority’s 
proposals and in the arguments and evidence 
against them.” (ibid.)
The above extracts show that the notion of 
evidence is used in its quasi-judicial term, which 
is not signifi cantly different from what used to 
be called “reasoned justifi cation” that all pre-
vious plans had to provide for their policies 
and proposals. Early signs show that the test 
of soundness is largely based on procedural is-
sues and is often articulated through a tick box 
exercise. For example, the Chairman of the De-
velopment Plans Group at the Planning Offi -
cers’ Society argues that “more of the evidence 
relates to the validity or otherwise of the pro-
cesses followed, rather than the merit of par-
ticular sites.” (Wright 2003: 23) In response to 
the question: “What does soundness mean?” he 
suggests that it is about “whether the plan is 
fi t for its purpose,” (ibid.) which, considering 
what was mentioned earlier, leads us to a cir-
cular debate. The substantive evidence about, 
for example, the merit of one growth strategy 
compared with another does not feature large 
in the test of soundness. Yet, it does become the 
subject of heated debates that are grounded in 
different interpretations or frames of reference 
rather than the scientifi c validity or otherwise of 
technical evidence. 
Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The current enthusiasm for evidence-based pol-
icy derives largely from an instrumental view of 
policy-evidence interface. The underpinning as-
sumptions in such a view have a lot in common 
with the positivist approach to the planning sys-
tem. Both are based on ambitious and naïve as-
sumptions that the complex political and so-
cio-economic processes could be technicized, 
commanded and controlled through a scientifi c 
process. The sophisticated analyses advocated 
by the systems view of planning hardy reached 
the world of practice. While  the Structure Plans 
of the 1970s were backed by massive Reports of 
Survey with detailed statistical information, they 
lacked policy innovation and that elusive ingre-
dient called “imagination” which underpinned 
their predecessors. In the following decades of 
the 1980s and 1990s, the debate continued to 
focus so much on distinguishing planning pro-
cess (i.e., how to plan) as something separate 
from what is planned that the latter became ne-
glected. Attention moved away from developing 
the substantive evidence base of planning about 
how cities function (knowing what) to develop-
ing new ideas, such as communicative planning, 
about the process of planning (knowing how). 
It was not until the early 2000s that the need 
for developing the knowledge base of planning 
began to be advocated by the RTPI’s Educa-
tion Report. This stated that “planning educa-
tion should seek to promote critical thinking 
about space and place as the basis for action or 
intervention” (RTPI 2003: 1). For this to happen; 
i. e., for developing the substantive knowledge 
base of planning, it is crucial that a broader 
view of the policy/research interface based on 
the enlightenment model is maintained; one 
which aims to inform policy rather than spoon-
feed politicians, who after all may not have the 
time or inclination to follow it. Interaction and 
bridge-building between policy and research 
is crucial, but such bridges have to be capable 
of withstanding a two-way relationship between 
the two communities, where the agenda for both 
policy and research is being set through a pro-
cess of interaction. This is because narrow in-
strumentalism not only curtails imagination and 
creativity, it is also based on fragile assump-
tions about the research/policy interface. What 
is needed is less emphasis on evidence-based 
policy and more focus on what Smith (1996) 
calls, “an evidence-informed society” and the 
capacity to make use of the available evidence, 
because as Sir David King, the UK Government 
Chief Scientifi c Adviser, stresses “in recent years 
we have seen the level of public interest in evi-
dence-based issues increase, and in some cases 
the level of public confi dence in the govern-
ment’s ability to make sound decisions based on 
that evidence decrease.” (OST 2005: 1)
Notes
1 See www.evidencenetwork.org 
2 House of Commons Environment, Food and Ru-
ral Affairs Committee
3 This is the phrase which was used frequently 
during the Study Programme for European Spa-
tial Planning which was a predecessor to the 
ESPON programme
4 For example, Ebenezer Howard who pioneered 
the Garden City Movement in the late 19th cen-
tury was in fact a short-hand writer
5 Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act, 2004
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